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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAVELL H. HELF, ) BRIEF OF THE 
PETITIONER 
Petitioner, ) 
v. ) Case No. 940433-CA 
Priority No. 7 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ) 
and YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, 
INC. ) 
Respondents. ) 
Comes now the Petitioner, and by and through his 
attorney, hereby files the following Brief in support of his 
Petition for Review seeking a reversal of the June 28, 1994 
Order Denying Motion for Review. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §35-1-82.53(2), §35-1-86 and §63-46b-16. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether an injury arising from an idiopathic fall 
is compensable under the Utah Workers Compensation Act? 
2 . Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it 
concluded that the unexplained fall doctrine is not applicable 
to this case? 
3 . Whether the Industrial Commission erred when it 
concluded that Mr. Helf was not engaged in any activity that 
1 
created any strain, exertion or stress greater than that of 
his normal non employment life? 
4. Whether the Industrial Commission's decision 
violates the public policy and purpose of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act? 
5. Whether Mr. Helf was injured by accident arising 
out of and in the course of his employment? 
6. Whether the Petitioner's evidence proved legal 
causation? 
7. Whether the Petitioner's evidence proved medical 
causation? 
All issues involving questions of fact, such as 
issues 3, 5, 6 and 7, the court must apply the substantial 
evidence Chase v. Industrial Commission, 872 P. 2d 475, 478 
(Utah App. 1994) . 
All issues involving questions of law, such as 
issues 1, 2 and 4, the court must apply the corrections of 
error standard and give no deference to the Industrial 
Commission. Bevan v. Industrial Commission, 790 P. 2d 573 
(Utah App. 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes in this case are Utah 
Code Annotated §35-1-45 and §35-1-65. These statutes are set 
forth verbatim in the addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the case. This case involves a 
Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Industrial 
Commission's June 28, 1994 Order denying the Petitioner's 
claim for workers compensation benefits. 
2. Course of Proceeding. The Petitioner's 
Application for Hearing was heard before the Honorable Timothy 
C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge, on July 7, 1993, On 
August 12, 1993 Judge Allen entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order denying the Petitioner benefits. 
R. 54-59 The Industrial Commission affirmed Judge Allen's 
Order on June 28, 1994. R. 116-119 This instant Petition 
for Review was then filed with this court. 
3. Disposition by Industrial Commission. The Utah 
Industrial Commission, in a split decision denied the 
Petitioner's claim for workers compensation benefits on June 
28, 1994. R. 116-119 
4. Statement of facts. 
a. That Mr. Helf was employed by the defendant on 
September 9, 1992, as a truck driver. R. 55 
b. That on September 2, 1992, Mr. Helf drove his 
truck to Gates Rubber Company, arriving at approximately 6:30 
p.m. to pick up a shipment for his employer. R. 55 
c. That Yellow Freight Systems' trailers, one of 
which Mr. Helf drove to Gates Rubber, were approximately two 
to four inches higher than the loading dock. R. 152, 161, 170 
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d. That it was part of Mr. Helf's duties to lower 
a steel dock plate which connects, when completely lowered, 
the loading dock with the trailer. R. 148-156 
e. That to lower the metal dock plate, Mr. Helf had 
to bend over and pull a metal ring which would cause the dock 
plate to come up approximately three feet. R. 143, 149, 155-
156, 168 
f. That immediately after pulling the metal ring to 
"pop up" the metal dock plate, Mr. Helf had to walk up onto 
the plate, which was approximately three feet up (though there 
was testimony that said plate pops almost "straight up and 
down" R. 143) , to force the plate down on to his trailer. R. 
143, 145, 151, 153, 168 
g. That it was "fairly hard" to pull the metal ring 
because the ring and dock plate were "fairly new." R. 147 
h. That it is the weight of the person, walking the 
dock plate down onto the trailer, which actually forces 
the plate down. That a 175 pounds person does not weigh 
enough to force the plate down and must push against a wall 
for extra leverage to force the plate down into the trailer. 
R. 151, 153 
i. That prior to pulling the metal ring to pop up 
the plate Mr. Helf, with the assistance of an employee of 
Gates Rubber, moved some of the freight which was in his 
trailer. That freight, which was described as "awkward and 
pretty heavy", consisting of stoves which weighed a total of 
4 
1279 pounds and fiberglass grating weighing 200 pounds. R. 
79, 81, 82, 167 
That counsel for the defendant admitted that the 
hearing Exhibits reflect the contents of Mr. Helf's trailer. 
R. 197 
j . That the time between Mr. Helf moving the heavy 
and awkward freight in his trailer and him pulling the metal 
ring to pop the plate was just"seconds". R. 167 
k. That Mr. Helf fell backwards, while walking the 
metal dock plate onto his trailer. That at the time when Mr. 
Helf fell, the metal dock plate was still moving down and was 
on an angle, it was not level. R. 156, 158-159, 169 
1. That Mr. Helf sustained a severe head injury as 
a result of his fall onto the concrete loading dock. R. 51, 
5 6 and all the medical records submitted at the hearing. 
m. That Mr. Helf had a known history of idiopathic 
hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. See medical records of Dr. 
Null pages 130 to 140 of the medical records exhibit. 
n. That Dr. Speed in a November 11, 1992, letter 
stated: 
"Although the cause of [Mr. Helf's] fall at 
work on September [9] , 1992, remains unknown . 
In the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, it is therefore my opinion that Mr. 
Helf's brain injury was work related." 
o. That Dr. Null in a June 30, 1993, letter clearly 
indicates that the stress related to Mr. Helf's job, including 
the lowering of the dock plate and the heavy work "culminated 
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in a situation of an arrhythmia which resulted in his syncopal 
episode and subsequent head injury." R. 51 
p. That Freedman in a letter dated November 24, 
1992, opined that Mr. Helf's syncope was probably related to 
his cardiac condition. The doctor further stated that if the 
syncope was indeed on a cardiac basis, "it is likely that it 
was related to whatever level of exertion was present at the 
time." R. 50 
q. That Dr. Null, Dr. Freedman and Dr. Speed all 
opined that the syncopal episode suffered by Mr. Helf on 
September 9, 1992, was related to his work. R. 50, 51 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
That the Petitioner, Mr. Helf, was employed by 
Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. on September 9, 1992 as a truck 
driver. 
On that day, Mr. Helf drove his truck to Gates 
Rubber Company, arriving at approximately 6:30 p.m. to pick up 
a shipment for his employer. The employer's trailers, one of 
which Mr. Helf drove to Gates Rubber, were approximately two 
to four inches higher than the loading dock at Gates Rubber. 
It was one of Mr. Helf's duties to lower a steel 
dock plate that connects, when completely lowered, the loading 
dock with the trailer. To lower the metal dock plate, Mr. Helf 
had to bend over and pull a metal ring that would cause the 
dock plate to come up approximately three feet. This ring was 
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hard to pull because the equipment was fairly new. Immediately-
after pulling the metal ring to "pop up" the metal dock 
plate, Mr. Helf had to walk up onto the plate, which was 
approximately three feet up, to force the plate down onto his 
trailer. There was however testimony at the hearing before 
the Industrial Commission that the loading plate popped almost 
"straight up and down." It is the weight of the person, 
walking the dock plate down onto the trailer, which forces 
the plate down. A person who weighed one hundred seventy-five 
does weigh enough to force the plate down. Such a person must 
push against a wall for extra leverage to force the plate down 
into the trailer. 
Before pulling the metal ring to pop up the plate 
Mr. Helf, with the assistance of an employee of Gates Rubber, 
moved some freight that was in his trailer. That freight, was 
described as "awkward and pretty heavy, " consisting of stoves, 
which weighed a total of 1279 pounds and fiberglass grating 
weighing 200 pounds. It was just a matter of seconds between 
the time Mr. Helf moved the heavy and awkward freight in his 
trailer and his pulling of the metal ring to pop the dock 
plate. As Mr. Helf was walking the dock plate onto his 
trailer, Mr. Helf fell backwards. At the time Mr. Helf fell, 
the metal dock plate was still moving down and was on an 
angle, it was not level. Because of the fall Mr. Helf 
sustained a severe head injury that has left him totally 
disabled. 
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Mr. Helf had a known history of idiopathic 
hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. Dr. Speed in a November 11, 
1992, letter stated as follows: " [a]1though the cause of [Mr. 
Helf's] fall at work on September [9], 1992, remains unknown 
. . . In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it is 
therefore my opinion that Mr. Helf's brain injury was work 
related." 
Dr. Null in a June 30, 1993, letter clearly 
suggests that the stress related to Mr. Helf's job, including 
the lowering of the dock plate and the heavy work "culminated 
in a situation of an arrhythmia which resulted in his syncopal 
episode and subsequent head injury." 
Dr. Freedman in a letter dated November 24, 1992, 
opined that Mr. Helf's syncope was probably related to his 
cardiac condition. The doctor further said that if the 
syncope was indeed on a cardiac basis, "it is likely that it 
was related to level of exertion was present at the time." 
All the medical evidence presented at the hearing 
supports the conclusion that the severe head injury sustained 
by Mr. Helf on September 9, 1992 arose out of and during the 
course of his employment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. AN INJURY ARISING FROM AN IDIOPATHIC FALL IS 
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE UTAH WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
ACT. 
The Industrial Commission was correct when it stated 
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that the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation 
to workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in 
the course of" their employment. U.C.A. §35-1-45 R. 116 
The Industrial Commission concluded that there is no 
"causal connection between Mr. Helf's injury and his 
employment" and that Mr. Helf's "injury did not arise out of 
and in the course of his employment." R. 117 
The only evidence supportive of the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that there is no causal connection 
between his work and the injury is the fact that Mr. Helf did 
in fact suffer from some a predisposition to loss of 
consciousness and that he had prior heart condition diagnosed 
as idiopathic hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. The other 
evidence that marginally supports the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion is the fact that at the time of the fall Mr. Helf 
was walking up the dock plate to lower it into his trailer and 
he fell back onto the loading dock. R. 143, 158 Finally, the 
Industrial Commission recklessly states "that Mr. Helf's 
employment .did not enhance the risk of injury." R. 117 
In reaching this last conclusion, the Industrial 
Commission does at least recognize that an accident may be 
compensable if the risk of injury is enhance by the conditions 
of the employment. R. 117 This recognition by the 
Industrial Commission is an acknowledgment that in this State 
the idiopathic fall doctrine is still an operative legal 
doctrine. 
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The idiopathic fall doctrine has been recognized by 
the Supreme Court of Utah. In Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 
150 P. 2d 379 (Utah 1944), that court awarded benefits to a 
worker, who fainted and struck her head on a bookshelf. The 
court once again in Kennecott v. Industrial Commission, 675 
P.2d 1187 (Utah 1983), (involving a claim for benefits when 
an employee of Kennecott suffered a heart attack, fell into a 
pool and drowned) recognized and applied the idiopathic fall 
doctrine. Id. at 1192.x 
Professor Larson has defined the idiopathic fall 
doctrine as involving claims arising out of a fall caused by 
a risk or condition personal to the claimant. Larson's The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation (1994) §12.00 at 3-249 
Professor Larson states as follows: 
"When an employee, solely because of a 
nonoccupational heart attack, epileptic fit, 
or fainting spell, falls and sustains a skull 
fracture or other injury, the question arises 
whether the skull fracture or other injury (as 
distinguished from the internal effects of the 
heart attack or disease, which of course are 
not compensable) is an injury arising out of 
the employment. 
The basic rule, on which there is now general 
agreement, is that the effects of such a fall 
are compensable if the employment places the 
employee in a position increasing the 
dangerous effects of such a fall, such as a 
height, near machinery or sharp corners, or in 
moving vehicles." [Emphasis added] 
As Professor Larson clearly points out in his 
The Petitioner recognizes that the applicable statute has been amended 
since the cited case was decided. But, that does not alter the applicability of 
the idiopathic fall doctrine to this case. 
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treaties, the last step, the requisite finding of employment 
contribution, has been whittled down to such an insignificant 
degree by the courts that this step is a mere nuisance. 
Larson §12.12 at 3-356 
Thus according to Professor Larson, this court must 
now determine if Mr. Helf's employment placed him in a 
position that increased the effects of his fall or if his 
employment aggravated his injury. 
The employment, according to Professor Larson, can 
increase the risk of such a fall either before or after the 
fall. If the employment does contribute something to the 
risk, the injury must be deemed to be one arising out of the 
employment. Larson, supra, §12.14(b) at 3-370 
Hence, the court in resolving this claim must 
determine if Mr. Helf's employment increased the risk or in 
some manner contributed, either before or after the fall, to 
the severe head injury sustained by Mr. Helf. 
With respect to before, Professor Larson points out 
such things as stress and exertion. Id. In this case, there 
is substantial evidence that Mr. Helf had great stress and 
exertion. R. 51, 76 
The testimony of the witnesses further supports 
this argument. Mr. Helf had to move the heavy and awkward 
material in his trailer, he had to engage the mechanism to 
lower the metal dock plate which was hard to do because it was 
new equipment, he had to immediately walk up onto that plate 
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to force it onto his trailer and he had to walk up an angle, 
or incline, to lower this plate. All of these factors support 
the argument that the employment contributed and increased the 
risk before the fall. After all, it is undisputed that at the 
time of the fall, Mr. Helf was walking up (on an angle) on the 
plate which was moving down. He was standing at an angle, on 
a moving piece of machinery when he fell. 
With respect to after, Professor Larson points out 
such things as moving mechanisms, height, sharp corners and 
moving vehicles. Id. 
In this case, once again, Mr. Helf was walking up on 
a metal loading dock plate which was being forced down by his 
weight when he fell backwards onto the loading dock. In 
addition, the plate was approximately three to seven inches 
higher than the loading dock. It is submitted that it is 
reasonable to assume that the reason Mr. Helf fell backwards, 
off the moving loading dock plate onto the concrete loading 
dock is because he was walking up an incline at the time he 
fell. 
Furthermore, there are medical records which 
indicate that the outcome of Mr. Helf's fall would have been 
different had he fallen onto a surface other than concrete. R. 
77 The facts and evidence establish that, under the 
idiopathic fall doctrine, Mr. Helf's severe head injury did 
arise out of his employment. His employment substantially 
increased the risk of his injury and placed him in a position 
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which increased the risk and dangerous effects of his fall. 
Professor Larson also asserts that under the 
idiopathic fall doctrine an injured worker is entitled to 
workers compensation benefits if the employment has placed the 
employee in a position where the consequences of blacking out 
were markedly more dangerous than if the employee had not been 
so employed. Larson, §12.12 at 3-356 to 3-358 
The Industrial Commission briefly addressed this 
when it ruled that the employment did not enhance the risk of 
injury. R.117 It is submitted that the Industrial Commission 
is just simply wrong. Mr. Helf's employment placed him in a 
position where he had to (after driving in afternoon traffic) 
move heavy freight, bend over and pull a metal ring (which was 
hard because it was new equipment) , and he then had to walk 
onto a metal dock plate (which popped up at least three feet) 
and use his body weight to force the metal plate down into his 
trailer. These activities and the force involved certainly 
placed Mr. Helf in a position where the consequences, and 
likelihood, of him blacking out and falling were markedly more 
dangerous than if he had not been discharging the duties of 
his employment. 
Although U.C.A. §35-1-45 provides that the injury 
must arise out of and during the course of employment, 
Professor Larson does not struggle with the "arising out of" 
and "during the course" of requirements are being mutually 
independent and exclusive. Professor Larson states: 
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In practice the course of employment and 
arising out of employment tests are not and 
should not be, applied entirely independently; 
they are both parts of a single test of work 
connection, and therefore deficiencies in the 
strength of one factor are sometimes allowed 
to be made up by strength in the other. 
Larson, supra, §29 at 5-476 
What Professor Larson is arguing is that in 
analyzing the compensability of these types of claims, the 
courts have, and must, in reality balanced the "course of" 
element with the "arising out of" element and affirm awards of 
benefits when one element is strong and the other is weak. 
As a matter of fact, Professor Larson notes that 
when the "course" element is so strong awards are becoming 
increasingly common. Id. 
When the Industrial Commission concluded that Mr. 
Helfs injury did not arise out of and during the course of 
his employment it ignored the above stated principle as 
proclaimed by Professor Larson. There are absolutely no facts 
upon which the Industrial Commission could reasonably conclude 
that Mr. Helf s injury did not arise during the course of his 
employment. What was Mr. Helf doing when he fell and suffered 
the severe head injury? The answer of course is that he was 
working for Yellow Freight. 
The Petitioner will concede that the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that the injury did not "arise out" of 
Mr. Helfs employment is at least supportable. After all, Mr. 
Helf did not have anything fall onto his head nor he did not 
injure his back while moving the heavy freight that was in his 
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trailer. 
This court however must look at the entire 
circumstance that led to Mr. Helf's fall. The driving in 
afternoon traffic, the moving the heavy, awkward freight, the 
pulling the pin, the walking onto the metal dock plate and the 
angle at which he was standing at the time of the fall. These 
factors, coupled with the medical evidence, certainly overcome 
the flimsy evidence supporting the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion. 
II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED WHEN HE CONCLUDED 
THAT THE UNEXPLAINED FALL DOCTRINE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE TO THIS CLAIM, 
The Industrial Commission concluded that the 
unexplained fall doctrine does not apply to this claim 
"inasmuch as Mr. Helf had a syncopal episode which caused the 
fall." R. 57 
However, Professor Larson defines the unexplained 
fall doctrine as a fall at work for no discoverable reason 
"but for" which his employment injury would not have happened 
if the employee had not been engaged upon an employment errand 
at the time of the fall. Larson, supra, §10.31(a) at 3-94-95 
If there is no way to determine whether the fall was 
idiopathic, then the fall should be treated as an unexplained 
fall. 
As discussed above, an idiopathic fall is one caused 
by the internal failure, e.g., heart attack. But, the 
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Industrial Commission has concluded that Mr. Helf's syncopal 
episode "was not related to his preexisting heart condition." 
R. 56 
If this is so, then according to the Industrial 
Commission, there is no discoverable reason for the fall and, 
therefore, the Industrial Commission must apply the 
"unexplained fall" doctrine. That doctrine then requires a 
finding that "but for" the employment Mr. Helf would not have 
been injured. Therefore, he is entitled to benefits. 
In Moore v. Darling Store Fixtures, 732 S.W.2nd 496 
(Ark. 1987) the employee fell while either climbing off or 
after climbing off a forklift. He sustained a heart attack 
and skull fracture. There was no way to determine what caused 
the fall. See Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Industrial 
Commission, 796 P.2d 893, 897-898 (Ariz. 1990) wherein the 
court also adopted the "but for" standard to be applied in 
claims involving unexplained falls. In that case, the 
employee fell, for no known reason, after she had carried out 
trash to a dumpster. 
In the present claim, to follow logically the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion, there is no way to 
determine what caused the fall. Thus, this court should fall 
in line with the majority of the jurisdictions and award Mr. 
Helf benefits. The basis for this conclusion is altogether 
simple, Mr. Helf's severe head injury arose out of his 
employment. The injury would not have occurred "but for" the 
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fact that the conditions and obligations of his employment 
placed him in the position where he was injured. Id. at 898 
quoting Larson, supra, at §10.31 at 3-94 through 95. 
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED WHEN HE CONCLUDED 
THAT MR, HELF WAS NOT ENGAGED IN ANY ACTIVITY WHICH 
CREATED ANY STRAIN, EXERTION OR STRESS GREATER THAN 
THAT OF HIS NORMAL NON EMPLOYMENT LIFE, 
In its Finding number 11(R. 56) the Industrial 
Commission concluded that Mr. Helf, at the time when he fell 
at work, was not engaged in any activity which created stress, 
exertion or strain greater than that of his normal life. 
The Industrial Commission concluded that Mr. Helf's 
preexisting heart condition was not related to his fall. The 
Commission nonetheless found that Mr. Helf's exertion, at the 
time of the accident, did not exceed that of his 
nonemployment life. R. 56 This is an error. This 
conclusion by the Industrial Commission is based upon the 
Industrial Commission's flawed reasoning that "the work 
environment exposed Mr. Helf to no more danger than would a 
similar fall on a sidewalk, driveway, or any other hard, flat 
surfaces that are common to everyday life." R. 117 
The Industrial Commission's conclusion might be 
supportable if Mr. Helf had fallen while he was standing on 
the loading dock not doing anything. However, the Industrial 
Commission conveniently ignores the following facts: 
1. Mr. Helf had just moved freight, 
which was "awkward and pretty heavy", it 
17 
consisted of stoves that weighed a total of 
127 9 pounds and fiber glass grating that 
weighed 200 pounds. R. 79, 81, 82 and 167 
2. Mr. Helf had to bend over to pull a 
pin that triggered the release of the dock 
plate; R. 143, 149, 156 and 168 This pin was 
not easy to pull because it was new equipment. 
R. 147 
3. Mr. Helf had to then immediately walk 
onto this plate to force it down into the 
trailer. This plate, which was approximately 
three feet up (though there was testimony that 
said plate pops almost "straight up and down" 
R. 143) , to force the plate down on to his 
trailer. R. 143, 149, 156 Mr. Helf's weight, 
when he begin to walk up the plate, forced the 
plate down. A person who weighs 175 pounds 
person does not weigh enough to force the 
plate down and must push against a wall for 
extra leverage to force the plate down into 
the trailer. R. 151, 153 
In light of the foregoing facts, it is baffling how 
the Industrial Commission failed to recognize the causal 
connection between Mr. Helf's head injury and his employment. 
The only time that a comparison between the 
employment exertion and the nonemployment exertion is made is 
in a case where the preexisting condition contributes to the 
industrial injury. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 
15, 25-26 (Utah 1986). 
Even if this claim is one where the application of 
the Allen test is appropriate, it is submitted that the 
employment exertion was unusual and extraordinary. Mr. Helf 
had to move "heavy and awkward" material in his trailer to 
make room for the shipment he was picking up at Gates Rubber. 
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He had to bend down and pull a metal ring, which was "fairly 
hard" in order to "pop up" the metal loading dock plate and 
then had to walk up onto the plate to force it onto his 
trailer. That plate was spring loaded and would automatically 
return into its non-use position unless Mr. Helf immediately 
walked onto it. A person who weighed 175 pounds could not 
force that plate down without using a "wall" as additional 
leverage to force that plate down. 
Thus, it is submitted that, if the Allen test does 
apply to this claim, Mr. Helf's employment on the date of his 
industrial accident did require unusual and extraordinary 
exertion. 
IV. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONS DECISION VIOLATES THE 
PUBLIC POLICY AND PURPOSE OF THE UTAH WORKERS7 
COMPENSATION ACT. 
Mr. Helf, in order to be awarded benefits under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act, must establish that his severe 
head injury arose out of and during the course of his 
employment. U.C.A. §35-l-45( as amended). 
There is no question or doubt that Mr. Helf was 
injured during the course of his employment. After all, he 
was doing his job at the time when he fell. The question is 
whether his injury "arose out of his employment". 
To answer that question, this court cannot forget 
the social purpose of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
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Utah courts have long recognized, and held, that the purpose 
of this Act is to alleviate the financial hardship on an 
injured worker and his family by spreading the cost of an 
injury throughout the industry that employs the worker. 
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 364 P.2d 1020,1022 
(Utah 1961) . To further this purpose, any doubt must be 
resolved in favor of the injured worker. Heaton v. Second 
Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah 1990) . 
The Industrial Commission in this case has dumped 
the entire financial hardship on Mr. Helf and his family. Mr. 
Helf who will never be able to return to work,2 was not given 
the benefit of any doubt. Should this court decide to affirm 
the Industrial Commission's decision, this court will tell all 
workers of this State that if they are injured while doing 
there job, they will find themselves without the protection 
and benefits they thought the Utah Workers7 Compensation Act 
provided for them and their families. For if the Industrial 
Commission's decision is allowed to stand, the workers of this 
State will know that being on the job and doing their job, 
when they sustain an injury, is not enough to be afforded the 
protection of the Utah Workers7 Compensation Act. 
2 
Mr. Helf has been found to be totally disabled by the Social Security 
Administration, and awarded total disability benefits, as a result of the injury 
he sustained on September 9, 1992 while working for Yellow Freight. 
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V. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ESTABLISHES BOTH LEGAL AND MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that Mr. 
Helf' "employment nor any activities related thereto were the 
legal cause or medical cause of his injury." R. 57 The 
Industrial Commission appears to also reach that conclusion. 
R. 116-117 
This court has ruled that when a claimant has no 
preexisting risk factors, any exertion connected with the 
employment will satisfy the legal causation test. Workers 
Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 761 P.2d 
572, 574 (Utah App. 1988). 
As indicated by Commissioner Carlson in his 
dissenting opinion (R. 118-119) there is no full agreement 
between the medical experts who have treated or examined Mr. 
Helf. The Industrial Commission adopted the finding that Mr. 
Helf's preexisting heart problem did not cause his fall. R. 
56, 116 
Hence, if the preexisting condition was not a factor 
in Mr. Helf falling, then "any exertion connected with" Mr. 
Helf's employment is sufficient to satisfy the legal causation 
requirement. That exertion, as stated above, entailed the 
moving heavy freight, pulling the hard to pull pin and then 
walking onto the metal dock plate to force it down into his 
trailer. 
The medical evidence also established, by more than 
a mere preponderance, that Mr. Helf's severe head injury was 
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the direct result of his employment. Drs. Speed, Null, 
Freedman and Heilbrun all opined that Mr. Helf's injury arose 
out of his employment. R. 74, 76, 77, 78 and 378 of Volume 2 
of the Record 
Whether the higher Allen standard is applicable or 
the lower standard, in either case Mr. Helf has established by 
more than a preponderance of the evidence both legal and 
medical causation to be awarded workers compensation benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Helf has demonstrated by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the severe head injury he sustained while 
discharging his job duties arose out of and during the course 
of his employment. Mr. Helf has demonstrated this under the 
idiopathic fall doctrine and under the unexplained fall 
doctrine. 
The Industrial Commission's decision clearly 
confuses those two doctrines. If, as the Industrial 
Commission found, Mr. Helf's fall was not due to his 
preexisting heart condition, then it cannot be an idiopathic 
fall and must be an unexplained fall. As such, Mr. Helf is 
entitled to benefits based upon the unexplained fall doctrine 
as it is defined by Professor Larson. 
If, however, this court determines, upon examination 
of the extensive medical records, that the fall was the result 
of a preexisting condition, then it is submitted that Mr. 
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Helf is also entitled to benefits. Mr. Helf has established 
that his employment certainly contributed to and increased the 
risk of his head injury. Mr. Helf has proven that "but for" 
his employment he would not have sustained the severe head 
injury. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully 
submitted that Mr. Helf be awarded the benefits he claimed in 
his application for hearing. 
Dated this 16th day of December 1994. 
Hans M-rpSttyeffler^y 
Attorney for—Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of December 
1994 two copies of the forgoing were delivered to the 
following: 
David M. McConkie Alan L. Hennebold 
Attorney for Employer Attorney for Industrial 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower Commission 
60 East South Temple 160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this 16th day of December 1994. 
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David M. McConMe (A2154) 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
Attorney for Employer 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAVELL H. HELF, : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Claimant, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
vs. 
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. : 
Employer. : 
Case No. 93-20 
This matter came on regularly for hearing before the Honorable Timothy C. 
Allen, on the 7th day of July, 1993. Applicant, Lavell Hell was present and was 
represented by attorney, Hans Scheffler. Employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc., was 
represented by attorney David M. McConkie. The Administrative Law Judge, having 
considered the testimony presented at the hearing and having reviewed the exhibits and 
A n n H i n i m i i r»A/-»c- * 
OftO.Sd 
file herein, and good cause appearing, hereby enters the foUb^ving-Fkdings of Fact, 
j - .* - » • 
Conclusions of Law, and Order. • - * * * *. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 9, 1992, Lavell H. Helf was employed as a truck driver by 
Yellow Freight System, Inc., in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. On September 9, 1992, at approximately 6:30 p.rcL, Mr. Helf arrived at 
Gates Rubber Company in Salt Lake City, Utah to pick up a shipment for his 
employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc. 
3. While standing on the Gate Rubber Ccmpany loading dock, Mr. Helf 
bent over and pulled up on a metal ring which releasei a spring-loaded metal dock 
plate, causing the plate to raise and extend to the ba:k of me trailer. 
4. It took minimal exertion to pull the ring and release the dock plate (less 
than 20 pounds) and Mr. Helf did not have any problem pulling the ring. 
5. After pulling the ring, Mr. Helf walked onto the plate toward his trailer. 
While Mr. Helf was standing on the plate, his hands went down to his sides, he went 
rigid, jerked back, and fell straight back hitting his head on the flat cement floor of the 
loading dock. When Mr. Helf fell, he did not call out or make any other sound. He 
did not attempt to break his fall with his hands. He was unconscious before he hit the 
floor. 
, . - > » • 
6. The cock plate on which Mr. Helf was standing at tlie* time of his fail 
was two inches higher than the surface of the loading dock. 
7. Mr. Helf was injured when his head hit the flat surface of the loading 
dock. 
8. For several yean prior to his fall, Mr. Helf received medical treatment 
for a heart condition diagnosed as idiopathic hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. 
9. Mr. Helf s fall was caused by an idiopathic syncopal episode of unknown 
origin. The fall was not caused by any external cause related to the dock plate or by 
any other external cause such as tripping, slipping, ^tc. 
10. Tne syncopal episode which resulted in Mr. Helf s fail was not related 
to his pre-existing heart condition. 
11. Mr. Keifs injury coincidentally occurred at work because of his 
idiopathic condition without any enhancement from the workplace. Prior to and at the 
time of his syncopal episode and fail, Mr. Helf was not engaged in any activity which 
created any strain, exertion, or stress greater than that of his normal nonempioyment 
life or the normal nonempioyment life of any other person. His syncopal .episode and 
injury did not result from any strain, exertion, or stress related to his employment 
12. Mr. Keifs employment did not contribute anything to increase the risk 
of injury that he or any other worker normally faces in everyday life. Neither the 
composition of the cement loading dock nor the fact that the dock place was two 
inches higher than me dock floor increased the risk of injury ;that- Mr. 'Helf or the 
» • 
average worker normally faces in everyday nonemployment life, 2&r. "Helf s employment 
did not increase the dangerous effects of Ms faiL 
13. Mr. Helf failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
injured, by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with-the 
employer, Yellow Freight System, Inc. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Keif was not injured by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment with his employer. 
2. Neither Mr. Helf s employment nor any activities related thereto were 
the legal cause or medical cause of his injury. 
3. The "unexplained fall" doctrine is not applicable to the facts of this case 
inasmuch as Mr. Keif had a syncopal episode which caused the fall. 
4. Mr. Helf is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits as set forth in 
§ 35-1-1, et seq., Utah Code Ann. 
ORDER 
The Administrative Law Judge, having made and entered his Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law in the above entided matter, and good cause appearing 
therefor, HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that this matter be and 
the same is hereby dfsrnksgd with prejudice. 
AnncMnnn/ i D A O C A 
• » - , 
« • • • » • « I 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review ;o'f- the foregoing 
shaH be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail 
the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and 
not subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is timely Sled, the 
parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the date of Sing with the Commission, in 
which to file a written response with the Commission in accordance with § 63-
46(b)(12)(2), Utah Code Ann. 
DATED this / ^ d a y of August, 1993. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF J1AH.;. , 
LAVELL HELP, * 
* » 
Applicant, * 1 I * 
ORDER DENYING 
VS. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
• 





Lavell H. Helf asks the Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review an Administrative Law Judge's Order denying benefits under 
the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Commission exercises jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-32.53, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12 and Utah 
Administrative Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the Findings of Fact set forth in the 
ALJ's Order of August 12, 199 3. A summarization of those facts 
follows: 
For several years prior to the incident in question, Mr. Helf 
suffered from episodes of unexplained loss of consciousness, known 
as "syncope" in medical terminology. Such episodes occurred 
randomly and were not related to any particular activity or 
situation. 
On September 9, 1993, Mr. Helf was employed as a truck driver 
for Yellow Freight. While preparing to load freight into his 
trailer, he experienced another syncopal episode. Witnesses report 
that Mr. Helf toppled backward, with* no effort to break his fall. 
He was apparently unconscious by the time he fell to the flat 
surface of the loading dock. 
Mr. Helf's exertions at work on September 9, 1993 were no 
greater than those of his nonemployment life, nor were his 
exertions greater than customarily experienced by average 
individuals in normal every day life. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act provides compensation to 
workers who are injured by accident "arising out of and in the 
course of" their employment. (Utah Code Ann. §3 5-1-45.) It is the 




worker's burden to prove the causal relationship between his or her 
work and injury. 
The record in this matter establishes that Mr.IHel'f suffered 
a predisposition to loss of consciousness. While there is some 
medical opinion that Mr. Helf 's work activities contributed to his 
loss of consciousness on September 9, 1993, the preponderance of 
evidence establishes that Mr. Helf's work did not trigger his loss 
of consciousness. 
Because Mr. Helf's loss of consciousness and resulting fall 
were the result of a condition peculiar to Mr. Helf himself, the 
injuries that he sustained in the fall are not a consequence of his 
employment. 
As noted in Commissioner Carlson's dissent, an accident not 
directly caused by employment may nonetheless be compensable if the 
danger of injury is enhanced by the conditions of employment. In 
this case, Mr. Helf's employment did not enhance his risk of 
injury. When Mr. Helf lost consciousness, he fell to the flat 
surface of the loading dock. The vork environment exposed Mr. Helf 
to no more danger than would a similar fall on a sidewalk, 
driveway, or any of the other hard, flat surfaces that are common 
to everyday life. 
In light of the foregoing, we do not find a causal connection 
between Mr. Helf's injury and his employment. Because Mr. Helf's 
injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, we 
conclude the injury is not compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
ORDER 
The Commission hereby affirms the Order of the Administrative 
Law Judge dated August 12, 1993. 





At the time of his injury, Mr. Helf,- was preparing to load 
additional freight into his trailer. He moved an'd adjusted the 
heavy freight already loaded, and then immediately performed 
maneuvers required to bring up a heavy, spring-loaded metal plate 
from the surface of the loading dock to form, a ramp between the 
dock and the trailer- It was customary to Lock the plate down into 
position by walking on the moving plate, which was positioned at a 
slight upward incline. While doing so, Mr. Helf suddenly fell 
backward, striking his head on the dock, and receiving severe 
injury. 
Such a fall, even if not directly caused by employment, is 
compensable if the danger of injury either before or after the fall 
is enhanced by employment activities or workplace conditions to a 
degree beyond that which would be experienced by a member of the 
general public pursuing normal everyday activities. Larson, The 
Law of Workmen'*s Compensation, 3-349, 3-355, 3-371 (1993). The 
general public would not have been on a loading dock, shifting 
heavy freight, and stepping onto a moving metal loading ramp. 
These circumstances distinguish Mr. Helf's accident from a fall by 
a someone standing still on a stationary, level floor, as was the 
situation in Gates Rubber v. Industrial Comm'n. 705 P.2d 6 (Co. 
App. 1985), or from a slight height, as in Huahes v. Acme Steel, 
200 N.Y. S.2d 135 (N.Y. 1960). 
A preponderance of medical opinion, i.e., from Drs. Speed, 
Null, and Freedman, concurs that Mr. Helf's injury arose out of his 
employment, that is, the fall occurred to some degree due to 
conditions"of. the workplace or to- physical stress and exertion 
related to the job, as required by Utah Code Ann. § 3 5-1-45. 
Though the medical experts are not in full agreement, evidence 
indicates that the fall may have resulted from a syncopal episode, 
or loss of consciousness, that may or may not have been caused by 
a cardiac condition. It is uncontested chat Mr. Helf took regular 
medication to control idiopathic hypertrophic stenosis, a cardiac 
problem, and that he took the medication the morning of the 
accident. Mr. Helf had passed a Department of Transportation 
medical examination in 1990. 
Since- everyone on the dock was engaged in other activities 
when the accident occurred, no one was giving direct attention to 
Mr- Helf when he fell. Witnesses at the evidentiary hearing 
differed about the degree of incline, though all .agreed the ramp 
was somewhat inclined, about the amount of movement of the ramp, 
and about how much exertion was required to raise the platform and 
lock it into place. 




In view^  of uncertain circumstances surrounding the accident, 
it is impossible to determine the cause of the fall,which resulted 
in injury. Though the majority opinion found that the fall was 
caused by a syncopal episode which was personal to^tho,-applicant, 
Mr. Keif was in the act of performing the normal duti'es required by 
his employment when he was injured. These conclusions would 
require the issue to be resolved in favor the injured worker. 
Based on the foregoing, -I. would conclude that Mr. Helf's injury is 
work-related and is compensable. I therefore respectfully dissent. 
DATED THlS^£_^day of June, 199$-
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 20 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING' 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the ORDER 
DENYING MOTIOJJVFOR REVIEW in the case of LAVELL HELF, Case Number 
93-20, on <Z£E: day of June, 1994, to the following: 
HANS-SCHEFELER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
311 S. STATE STREET, #33 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
KAREN TOLBERT 
ADJUSTER 
YELLOW FREIGHT SYSTEMS, INC. 
P 0 BOX 7932 
OVERLAND PARK, KS 6 6 0 2 0 7 
DAVID M. MCCONKIE 
KIRTON, MCCONKIE S POELMAN 
60 E. SOUTH TEMPLE, # 1 8 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
8 4 1 1 1 - 1 0 0 4 
asb/helf 
Adell Butler-Mitchell (__ ^^Zf~ 
General Counsel's Office '°^r 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
T T THEUII 
UNIVERSITY 
OFUT/\H 
May 2 6 , 1993 
Hans M. Scheffler 
311 So. State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Lavell Helf 
MRN: 763211-0 
DOI: 9-10-92 
Dear Mr. Scheffler, 
Thank you very much for your letter dated May 24. I saw Mr. Helf 
today in follow-up. I have discussed wi~h him extensively the 
appropriateness of initiating vocational rehabilitation, and it 
appears that Mr. Helf is somewhat more accepting of this idea. 
With respect to your question which you broach in your letter 
regarding my opinion as to Mr. Helffs injuries and how they were 
sustained, I do feel strongly that the patientTs injuries were 
sustained in the workplace, and did arise in the course of his 
employment, and due to his employment. I can comfortably state 
that his outcome may have been different, had the patient struck 
his head on a surface other than concrete. 
If you have any further questions, or if I can be of any further 
assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
f\ 
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A « « « 4 « • 
November 11, 1SS2 
RE: Lavell Heif 
MEN# 763211-0 
Date of Injury: 9/10/92 
To Whom I t May Concern: 
Mr- Eelf i s a 45 year old man who sustained a traumatic bra in 
in ju ry in a f a l l while a t work on September 9, 1992. The p a t i e n t 
was i n i t i a l l y taXen to Pioneer Valley Hospital and subsequently 
t r anspo r t ed u l t imate ly to the University, of Utah Medical Center. 
A CT "scan of h i s head was obtained and showed a r igh t temporal 
hematoma, as well as temporal lobe contusion, as well as s c a t t e r e d 
p e t e c h i a l hemorrhages. There was no midline s h i f t or mass e f f ec t . 
The p a t i e n t ' s head injury was managed conservatively by the 
neurosurg ica l , team and the pat ient was then admitted t o the 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Unit on September 24, 19S2* 
Mr Self was t ransfe r red t o the cardiology Service on O c t o b e r ^ , 
1992 . a f t e r he developed complaints cf chest pain. ^ Cardiac 
monitoring and cardiac ca the ter iza t ion showed no evidence of 
myocardial in fa rc t ion , and the pa t ien t had no coronary a r t e ry 
pathology noted. Mr- Self was subsequently t ransferred back to the 
R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Unit for further management of the cogni t ive and 
o ther func t iona l de f i c i t s resul t ing from h i s traumatic bra in 
i n ju ry . 
Recently, Mr. Self was t ransferred to cardiology on November 10, 
1992 for pacemaker placement, which represen t s 'de f in i t ive t rea tment 
of h i s hyper t rophic cardiomyopathy. 
I t should a l s o he noted t h a t the pa t i en t has, had cardiac e l e c t r o -
phys io logic s tud ies performed while an inpat ient with
 # the 
Univers i ty of Utah Medical Canter, and no cardiac arrhythmias could 
be generated during t h i s study. 
Although t h e cause of the pa t ient 7 s f a l l at^worX. on September 10th 
remains unJoiown, I see no evidence by t h e ' p a t i e n t ' s ' h i s t o r y , or 
examination, or by observation of h i s behavior during h i s 
h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n , ^ t h a t i t was liJcely t h a t t h i s was due t o the 
p a t i e n t ' s p r e - ex i s t i ng cardiac problems. My; reason for s t a t i n g 
t h i s ^ i s t h a t the pa t ien t has had no episodes -whatsoever of syncope 
or d i zz ines s while on r ehab i l i t a t i on . Cardiac e lec t ro-physiologic 
s tud ies show no evidence of cardiac arrhythmias, which might be 
expected t o cont r ibu te a predisposi t ion to syncope and subsequent 
f a l l i ng* 
Physical Medkan* *nd Rehabilitation 
Unrrersity Metiicat Cfiflter 
SO North Medrcai Drive 
Page Two, Lavell Half, 11-11-92 i \ 
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,; i t i s ^herefjarer my 
opinion that Mr. H e l f s brain injury was work"related..." 3oV2\Ser,; i t 
should be noted that I am not a cardiologistl•«b^t.^m^a,*phys^^*trist 
with a subspecialty interest in traumatic brain injury* More 
d e f i n i t i v e statements regarding the patient 's cardiologic s ta tus 
should be obtained from his treating cardiologist!* :* 
• » 
• • • 
If there i s any question about this information*/ please do not 
h e s i t a t e to contact me. 
S incer e l y , ^^y If 
'<? 
John .Speed, M.B.B.S. 
A s s i s t a n t Professor 
D i v i s i o n of Phys ica l Medicine & Rehabi l i tat ion 
UUMC 
J S : j b 
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F. CLYDE NULL, M.D., F.A.C.P. 
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE-INTERNAL MEPlCirvE 
DIPLOMATS AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE. 
SUITE 3 F, ST. MARK'S OFFICE BUILDING 
I220 EAST 3900 SOUTH STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 2 4 , 
June 30, 1993 TELEPHONE2*30392 
Mr. Hans M. Scheffler 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Lavell H. Helf 
Dear Mr. Scheffler: 
I have reviewed the file on Mr. Lavell Helf with respect to his 
previous diagnosis of IHSS and the series of events on the day when 
Mr. Helf had fallen and cracked his head on the cement. 
From my discussions and review of the information signed by Alan 
Sackett, the Safety Administrator for Yellow Freight Lines, it 
would appear that Mr. Helf was in a situation where he was rushing 
to complete a hauling job. He was under pressure from the traffic, 
and it was near closing time. He had pulled a pin and was walking 
on the plate waiting for the forklift to load his order when he 
sustained, what would have appeared to have been, an arrhythmic 
episode or an episode of poor cardiac contractility resulting in a 
syncopal episode in which he fell and szruck his head on the 
concrete. This resulted in serious damage from a brain standpoint. 
Mr. Helf has had a situation with IHSS and episodes of arrhythmia 
in the past which were stable and controlled and which seemed to 
have culminated in this episode of syncope. I would think that in 
this situation where he was under stress to make the pick up, had 
the stress of removing the pin from the device to lower the plate, 
and the heavy work which he had been engaging in all culminated in 
a situation of an arrhythmia which resulted in his syncopal episode 
and subsequent head injury. 
If I can be of further assistance in defining this, please do not 
hesitate to let me know. 
With kindest regards, 
F. Clyde Null, M.D., F.A.C.P. 
FCN/bf 
r*r»o.cr^ 
CARDIOVASCULAR OISEASE • INTERNAL MEDICINE 
(DIPLOMATS. AMERICAN BOARD OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 
SUITE 3F. ST. MARK'S OFFICE 9UILD1NG 
I 2 2 0 EAST 39CO SOUTH STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 2 4 
TELEPHONE 2 6 3 - 3 8 9 2 
December 3, 1992 
Mr. Lavell Helf 
4916 Cherrywood Lane 
West Valley City, UT 84120 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I have been asked to prepare a letter with respect to 'Mr. Keif's 
injury on 9/10/92. I have followed this man for a long period of 
time because of the findings of hypertrophic subaortic stenosis 
(obstructive cardiomyopathy) with episodes of chest pain, and 
occasional episodes of arrhythmia. 
Mr. Helf apparently has had a syncopal or falling episode on 
9/10/92. Various studies have been done at the University of Utah 
Hospital, and Dr. Roger Freedman had recently written a statement 
indicating his feelings regarding Mr. Self's status. 
In view of the known propensity for individuals with IHSS to 
develop episodes of syncopes he had been carried on an outpatient 
basis in our office since 1988 utilizing a program consisting of 
verapamil 80 mg p.o. t.i.d. to control any arrhythmia. He had also 
been carried on niacin and Lopid to reduce his blood cholesterol 
levels. 
During the course of this injury he sustained, he had been doing 
some heavy working. Whether he tripped and fell to induce the head 
injury, or whether he had an arrhythmic episode to induce it was 
raised. Dr. Freedman and his associates were unable to induce any 
arrhythmia when Mr. Helf had been taking medications. That would 
suggest to us that an arrhythmia, as a consequence of his pre-
existing heart disease, probably did' not cause this episode of falling and injury to his head. Whether he may have, tripped to 
induce this or whatever other events might have transpired to 
induce it are unknown, since it was not observed by us and would 
rely on the testimony and observations of the individuals with him 
at the time of the episode. 
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In retrospect, I can only state that I am unaware of the cause for 
his fall and subsequent head injuries. On the basis of the fact 
that we have controlled his arrhythmia utilizing verapamil, and 
that no arrhythmia could be induced with the electrophysiological 
studies on this medication, it would suggest that an arrhythmia was 
not the cause for'~ hl~^f'al^'°aild'subsequent head injury. 
If further details Mre needed, this office may be contacted. 
With kindest regards, 
FCN/bf 
Roger A. Freedraan, M.D. 




November 24, 1992 
RE: Lavell Heif 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Mr. Helf is a patient of mine here at the University of Utah 
Medical Center whom I treated following a syncopal episode, fall, and cerebral 
contusion on September 9, 1992. The patient has a known history of idiopathic 
hypertrophic subaortic stenosis. During his hospitalization here, the patient 
underwent extensive cardiac and neurologic evaluation.- The cause of the patient's 
syncope could not be determined with absolute certainty, but in my opinion it was 
probably related to his cardiac condition, and he was treated as such. Syncopal 
episodes in patients with idiopathic hypertrophic suoaortic stenosis are often 
related to physical exertion, and therefore, if the syncope in this case was indeed 
on a cardiac basis, it is likely that it was related to whatever level of exertion was 
present at the time. 
Sincerely, 
Roger A. Freedman, M.D. 
Associate Professor of Medicine 
Division of Cardiology 
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January 4, 1992 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Re: Lavell Helf 
The patient and his wife note that they are still having problems and are quite distressed with 
their inability to convince the Workmen's Compensation carrier that the treated head injury 
was work related. I have reviewed the letters written by Drs. Null, Freeman and Speed. 
It is my opinion that this patient sustained a head injury while performing his duties at work. 
There is no information in the history that a syncope episode occurred preceeding the fall 
in which the patient struck his head. That such a syncable episode occured preceeding the 
accident is speculative due to the presence of a pre-existing cardiac condition. I advised Mr. 
and Mrs. Helf that if the controversy persists that they obtain the services of an attorney who 
has expertise and experience in this field. They advised me that they had contacted Mr. 
Dabney. I suggested that he would be one of the most qualified locally to handle this 
problem for them. 
Regards, 
M. Peter Heilbrun, M.D. 
MPH/ah 
cc: Hospital Chart #76-32-11-0 
(Tr: 1/4/93) 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
HEARING ROOM, 160 EAST 3 00 SOUTH 
P.O. BOX 510250 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151-0250 
Case NO. 93-20 
* * * * * 
LAVELL H. HELF, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * EVIDENTIARY HEARING 




* * * * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 7th day of 
July, 1993, commencing at the hour of 8:30 a.m., 
the Hearing in the above-entitled matter was held 
at The Industrial Commission of Utah, Hearing Room 
#334, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
This Hearing was electronically recorded. 
ORIGINAL 
STACY & ASSOCIATES 
717 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1188 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Applicant: HANS M. SCHEFFLER 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State St., #380 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
For the Defendant: DAVID MCCONKIE 
Attorney at Law 
Administrative Law Judge: TIMOTHY C. ALLEN 
* * * * 
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A It's the dock plate where the accident 
occurred. 
Q So this is at Gate's Rubber? 
A In D-4 for sure and D-3. I can't say about 
D-5. 
Q Okay. Can you describe for the Judge how 
these dock plates work? 
A Well, you bend over and they're level with 
the ground and cement floor, steel plate. 
Q Let me stop you. Level with the ground or 
with — 
A Level with the cement floor. They're in 
place in the floor. 
Q Which is the loading dock? 
A In the loading dock, back your trailer to 
the door, open your door, you have to bend down to the 
floor, pull the steel ring, the plate pops immediately 
almost straight up and down. 
Q Okay. 
A Then immediately it flips a lip — the lip 
out that goes on your trailer, you have to walk that 
plate immediately, you have to get right on it, or the 
lip will fall back down. 
Q Okay. 
A And walk the plate down to the trailer. 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's spring loaded and 
you have to walk it down. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: May I continue? Maybe it will 
become clear if I could just ask a few more questions, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. Okay. 
That's fine, but I thought that the contention was that 
he struck his head on the plate. 
THE WITNESS: No. He struck his head on the 
cement floor. 
THE COURT: Okay. While he was walking this 
thing back — while he was walking the dock plate down? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Yes. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. Fine. Okay. Well, we 
don't need to dwell on that a lot do we? I mean — 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I think — 
THE COURT: Okay. It raises up, he's walking 
it down and then something happens and he falls; right? 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Yeah. I think though it's 
important for you in light of what happened that you 
understand where the plate was, what position it was in 
at the time that Mr. Helf fell. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I think that's a very critical 
factor for you. 
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A You can see the ring where you have to pull 
it- There's a ring on the plate and you have to bend 
over level with the floor and you have to bend over. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Just for the record, Your 
Honor, on D-6 it's on the lower righthand corner of the 
dock plate. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. That's like a recessed 
pull ring? 
THE WITNESS: It's a ring. Yeah. Yeah. And 
it would be level with the floor. 
THE COURT: And so then you — So when you 
pull it up — 
THE WITNESS: It pops up like it is now. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay, so it doesn't — so the 
opening is not right — it's actually hinged then on 
this side? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's hinged along the 
bottom. 
THE COURT: Okay. It's hinged along the 
bottom. 
THE WITNESS: With some springs that pop up 
when you pull this pin. 
THE COURT: Oh, and so this ring then actually 
is part of a catch mechanism? 


























THE COURT: Like a door latch? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And so you pull that and then it's 
connected to some — 
THE WITNESS: It's on a chain. 
THE COURT: Oh, it's a chain? 
THE WITNESS: It's on a chain. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
THE WITNESS: You pull it on a chain. 
THE COURT: And then it pulls a catch and that 
catch causes the dock plate to pop up? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Ah hah. I see said the Judge. 
Okay. That makes sense now. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: Now the Attorney will ask a 
foolish question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By MR. SCHEFFLER) How far up does this 
plate actually pop when you pull that ring? 
A Three feet. 
Q Okay. So it starts out level with the 
loading dock? 
.A Uh huh. 
Q And then when you pull the ring it comes up 
approximately three feet? 
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A Yeah. Three feet, maybe a little higher, 
Q Okay, Okay- And — Now, you mentioned 
awhile ago there is a lip at the end of this dock 
plate? 
A Uh huh. 
Q What is that lip, which I don't think is — 
Is that depicted in any of the photographs? 
A No. You can't see that unless you was 
looking down on it or — you can see the plate. When 
the plate pops up there's a foot lip that's the same 
width of the plate, there's a foot, it's about a foot 
wide, and it's a lip and it pops up. That's what goes 
on the trailer to set it down on the trailer. It's on 
the hinge and it pops up. 
THE COURT: Uh huh. 
THE WITNESS: It's got a hydraulic arm that 
holds it out there. If you don't walk it up 
immediately, the lip falls back down. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay, I'm with you. 
Q (By MR. SCHEFFLER) And the Judge awhile ago 
asked the purpose of the plate, and is the purpose of 
this plate to connect the dock to the trailer so you 
can drive onto the trailer to load it or unload it? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: With a forklift; right? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By MR. SCHEFFLER) All right. Now, you 
pull the pin and you said you have to walk it 
immediately? 
A Yeah. You have to walk it right now or the 
lip will fall back down. 
Q And you'd have to start all over? 
A Yeah. 
Q Okay. How hard is it to walk this plate 
down? 
A Well, it's brand new stuff and it's spring 
loaded. Me myself, sometimes I have to push on the 
wall to get it all the way down. I mean it's -- I 
weight 175 pounds and I can't get it to come and land 
on the trailer. I mean I can't just walk it down. 
Sometimes I have to push on the wall a little bit to 
get it to come down all the way. 
Q Okay. And when you're talking all the way 
down, you're talking about this lip into the trailer? 
A Flat on the trailer. When it's sitting flat 
on the trailer, it's on an incline, because the trailer 
sits higher than the dock. 
Q Okay. How much higher does the trailer sit 
than the dock? 
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A Some three or four inches. 
Q Okay. And so when the plate and the lift is 
actually in the trailer, the plate is still about three 
or four inches above the loading dock? 
A At the point where the lip is, where your 
trailer is, it's on an angle going up so you can drive 
into it with a forklift. 
Q Okay. Did you see Mr. Helf pull the pin? 
A Well, I — 
Q On this date? 
A — didn't actually like watch him pull it 
and walk up. I mean we are standing there talking to 
Nick that worked for Gate's about my freight, Lavell 
had his back to us and just kind of popped the plate 
and I kind of seen him walking into the trailer. 
Q So he was walking the plate down? 
A Yeah. We was just -- the three of us were 
standing there for a minute and he was asking what he 
was getting and I was talking to Nick about what 
freight I was getting for the day at the time-. 
Q Let me stop you here. At the time you were 
talking to Mr. Helf, did he appear to be having any 
difficulties or problems? 
A No. He seemed to be as sharp as the fifty 
times I'd seen him before that. 
Q Okay. So — 
THE COURT: Just a second. I guess I'm still 
somewhat confused. When you're walking down the plate, 
does that require that — Okay. You pull the pin, the 
plate pops up the three feet that it does because it's 
on that spring, and then do you physically then walk 
across the plate itself? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. You have to walk up that 
plate to get it to go back down. 
THE COURT: Okay. Okay. So you walk and then 
as you're walking you're weight pushes it down? 
THE WITNESS: Your weight pushes it down. 
THE COURT: And so when you were testifying 
that sometimes -- you weight 175 pounds, but sometimes 
even 175 pounds isn't enough weight to push it down? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: And so then what, you put your 
hand up on the ceiling or — 
THE WITNESS: Oh, just on — there's a wall 
where the doors are and I just kind of push against the 
wall to get it to go down. 
THE COURT: Okay. The wall of the truck or — 
THE WITNESS: No. The wall of the building. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay, because that's not 
readily visible here, but that would be like just to 
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the side here then? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. Just the wall there, just 
kind of put my hand on the wall to push it down. 
THE COURT: Oh, okay. And then as you push 
that down, then that — 
THE WITNESS: Get a couple extra pounds. 
THE COURT: Then that — Then there's a lip 
underneath here that we can't see --
THE WITNESS: That pops up. 
THE COURT: That also — Okay. And that — So 
that completes the bridging then between the dock plate 
and the truck, that one foot lip? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
THE COURT: So if we drew a picture it would 
look like this? I'm a lousy artist, but it would look 
like this, this would be the dock plate and then this 
would be that lip? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah. And it flips out. 
THE COURT: Okay. You want to see my art? 
MR. MCCONKIE: I was expecting a little more. 
I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: I preference that. Come on, there 
was a disclaimer there. Thank you, Counsel, for that. 
MR. MCCONKIE: I object to that. 
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THE COURT: Right. Okay. It's been stricken. 
All right. Thanks. 
Q (By MR. SCHEFFLER) All right. So you 
weren't -- To make sure that I don't mischaracterize 
your testimony, you weren't specifically watching Mr. 
Helf pull the pin? 
A No. I wasn't staring at — sitting there 
staring at him watching him do this. 
Q But you did see him start to walk the plate 
down into the trailer; is that right? 
A Me and Nick was standing about from me to 
this man here away from him, maybe a little further, 
fifteen to twenty feet. 
Q Fifteen feet. I think he's talking about 
Mr. McConkie. 
A And — Okay. And he had his back to us. 
Q He being Mr. Helf? 
A Yes. Mr. Helf. And we were standing I mean 
looking — facing, you know, his back, looking at his 
back. If we were staring, we'd be staring at his back, 
and we were talking a little bit and he popped the 
plate up. I mean we seen him, but we didn't stare at 
him doing it, actually watch every move that he made as 
far as that goes. 
Q Let me stop you here. But you're sure he's 
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the one who bent down and pulled this pin that we've 
talked about? 
A I'm positive of it. 
Q Okay, And then what, you're staring at him 
and then what do you see? 
A The plate come up, he started walking up it. 
He was just about to the top, the plate was about maybe 
two or three inches from being all the way on the 
trailer, which wouldn't be level, it would be on the 
trailer when he fell. 
Q Okay. So at the time you saw him fall, was 
the plate flat or was it on an angle? 
A No. It's on an incline going into the 
trailer. 
Q Okay. And the plate had not gone all the 
way down into the trailer? 
A Not yet. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Your Honor, I'd object. He's 
leading his witness right down the road here. I 
think — 
THE COURT: Right into the trailer. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Right into the trailer. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: That's where we want to go. 
MR. MCCONKIE: I think he can ask his question 
and get a more appropriate answer. 
0G153 
A I seen him walking up the plate, the plate 
was almost all the way down like I said, and he was of 
to the left corner of the plate towards the end almost 
up towards the very top of the plate when he fell --
when his hands -- his hands went -- was to his sides 
and then he fell backwards. 
Q Okay. And was his back still towards you 
when he fell? 
A Yeah. All we seen was his back. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I don't have any further 
questions, Your Honor, of this witness. 
THE COURT: Okay. Cross. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Thank you, Your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
By MR. MCCONKIE: 
Q Mr. Childs, you indicated that when you 
spoke with Mr. Helf before he walked to the plate that 
he seemed just as chipper and good as ever; is that 
right? 
A Seemed fine. 
Q Didn't appear overly tired or stressed? 
A I don't know if he showed stress or not. 
Q But he didn't appear it to you; is that 
right? 
A No. 
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Q You also indicate that you did not see him 
pull the pin; is that right? 
A No* I said that I seen him pull the pin. I 
mean we didn't stare at him doing it, but we were 
looking at him like this. You see a man with a big 
three foot plate or whatever, you see him pull the pin 
on it. Yes. We did see it. I seen him pull the pin. 
Q He didn't appear to be struggling to pull 
the pin did he? 
A No. 
Q Okay. He just pulled the pin just as 
normal; is that right? 
A Yeah. Normal on them new plates is jerking 
on the chain pretty hard though. 
Q Now, I want you to describe again for us 
what you saw immediately prior to his fall. You said 
he stopped his walk; is that right? 
A I said he walked. No. He walked up to the 
top. He was almost to the top of the plate. 
Q Okay. And then what happened? 
A That's when he fell. 
Q And then he — 
A The plate was almost down. It was a couple 
inches off the --
Q Was he walking or was he — had he stopped 
n r%r%r 00153 
appear to« No. 
Q Okay. He- didn't trip did he? 
A I don't know. 
Q No one pushed him? 
A No one pushed him, that's for sure. 
Q No freight fell on him? 
A No freight fell on him. 
Q So you don't know what caused him to fall; 
is that right? 
A I haven't the faintest idea. 
Q Did he appear to you to be unconscious 
before he hit the floor? 
A I'm not a doctor. I don't know. 
Q Well, how did he appear to you? 
A Didn't. He had his back to me. 
Q But he didn't try to break his fall? 
A Not that I seen. No. 
Q When you talk about the trailer being three 
or four inches higher than the dock, is that this 
particular trailer or is that just the normal trailer 
that you see in there? 
A That's the average trailer other than 
Northwest Freight has low profile trailers, low profile 
tires, and they sit almost even with the dock. Yellow 



























freight; do you recall? I'm sorry. 
A It was some — just a couple of pieces of 
freight. It was just awkward and that's why I helped 
him kind of make some room in the trailer with him. 
Q Were these heavy pieces? 
A They were kind of heavy, but they were more 
awkward you know. 
Q But it was awkward? 
A It was awkward. It was pretty heavy. 
Q What do you mean by awkward? 
A Well, you know, like the thing was kind of 
long. You need someone just to — I just needed to 
help him move them -- move them so he could have some 
room. 
Q Room for whatever he — 
A Yeah. So I could put on the freight. 
Q All right. After you did that, then what 
happened? 
A Okay. Then I -- You know, I came out and 
jumped on my forklift and he came out and popped the 
plate. 
Q Did -- How much time elapsed between the 
moving of the freight on the trailer and the popping of 
the plate? 
A Could be seconds. I mean it was just you 
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know — 
Q Now, what do you mean by when you say popped 
the plate? 
A Well, you bend down and pop — you know, it 
has a chain —• I mean it's just a little hook with a 
chain on it and you just pop it up. 
Q Okay. You pull it? 
A Yeah. But he had to bend down and pull it. 
Yeah. 
Q Did you see Mr. Helf pull this? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And after you saw him pull that, what 
happened? 
A You know the plate extends up and then he 
started walking on it to make it so it goes down and 
then --
Q Did you see him walk on the plate? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And then what did you see? 
A And then he got well about two or three 
inches down and then all of the sudden he just flipped 
back. 
Q Where were you standing at the time? 
A I was on the forklift. 
Q And were you behind Mr. Helf or to his side? 
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A I was right behind him. 
Q So his back was towards you? 
A Yes. It was. 
Q Was the plate all the way down? 
A When he fell? 
Q Yes. 
A No. It wasn't all the way flat. Like I 
say, it was two or three inches up when he fell back. 
THE COURT: Two or three inches off the ground 
or — 
THE WITNESS: Yes. It wasn't all the way down 
when he fell. 
Q (By MR. SCHEFFLER) And when you're talking 
down, you're talking into the trailer? 
A Well, it's not — It's going to be — I mean 
when the plate comes up it's going to be elevated and 
it comes down. I don't think it was all the way down 
when he fell back. 
Q When you say down, you're talking down into 
the trailer? 
A Yeah. Into the trailer. 
Q Okay. 
THE COURT: And then how far — how big of a 
distance is there between the floor of the trailer and 
the loading dock? 
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1 THE WITNESS: How — 
2 THE COURT: Yeah. How much of a step is 
3 there? There's a step isn't there? 
4 THE WITNESS: Yeah. It's never level. 
5 THE COURT: Right. 
6 THE WITNESS: It depends on each trailer you 
7 I know. 
8 THE COURT: Right. We had somebody else tell 
9 us that there's about three or four inches — there's 
10 about a three or four inch gap; does that sound about 
11 right? 
12 I MR. MCCONKIE: Your Honor, I object. You're 
13 leading the witness. 
14 THE COURT: I'm sorry. I get to do that. 
15 MR. MCCONKIE: No, but you can — 
16 THE COURT: The objection is noted. 
17 MR. MCCONKIE: I think he can testify 
18 without — 
19 THE COURT: Okay. What's your estimate? 
2 0 THE WITNESS: I'd say two inches — two to 
21 three inches. 
22 THE COURT: Now, this is between the bottom of 
23 the truck and the floor of the loading dock? 
24 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. 
25 THE COURT: So you have about a two inch? 
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MR. SCHEFFLER: Plus the stoves, Your Honor. 
If you look at the stoves that were on Exhibit A-2, 
which weighed Considerably more than two hundred 
pounds. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't have A-2. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: I'm sorry. I walked off with 
it. 
THE COURT: Hello. 
MR. SCHEFFLER: If the Defendants will admit 
to that, then I have no further evidence and I'll 
submit the matter. 
MR. MCCONKIE: Your Honor, we don't — we'll 
admit that the truck was loaded, and we don't have any 
reason to object that these manifests are accurate as 
to what was in the truck, but we certainly object to 
the inference that he was moving stoves. There's no — 
There's no testimony. Still the burden is on the 
Claimant to show what they were moving, how much it 
weighed, and the only testimony that could come in on 
that I suppose is from Mr. Valles, and he certainly 
didn't provide anything that the Commission can get 
ahold of to show what — the weights and sizes or 
anything, so the fact that there was freight on the 
truck, we don't object to that, and we don't object to 
the admission of the documents as beinn — *~A - » - » - -
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and m the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
curred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee 1988 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount ot 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 662/z% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
lOO'c of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed lOO c^ of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injur* over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty emplo\ ment is 
available to the employee from the employer tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid 
(2) The 'state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows* on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding /ear by 
twelve The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weeklv wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom 
1981 
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